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The name of David Andrew Graff is familiar for those who are interested in premodern Asian 
military history. The sinologist author studied warfare in medieval China since the beginning 
of his academic career, since 1998 he is the editor of the Journal of Chinese Military History 
and secretary of the Chinese Military History Society. He published a fundamental monograph 
on medieval Chinese warfare in the series Warfare and History of Routledge Publisher in 2002.1 
The author is an acknowledged authority of Chinese military history as a professor at Kansas 
State University.  
The significance of the monograph under discussion extends beyond East Asian or Chinese 
military history. It attempts to answer questions of technology transfer and warfare like the 
spread of military innovations and distinguishing regional ways of war such as ‘Western’ or 
‘Oriental’ by a comparison between 7th-century Byzantine and Tang warfare.  
The book raises a bold question with the comparison of late antique military manuals of empires 
located at opposite edges of the Old World. The two key texts are the Strategikon written at the 
turn of 6th and 7th centuries attributed to the emperor Maurice and a lost Chinese military manual 
(Li Jing bingfa) by a 7th-century Tang General Li Jing survived only in extracts. Graff did even 
more: he exhaustively described 7th-century Chinese and Byzantine warfare and attempted to 
explain the convergence of these two independent systems.  
Consequently, the book is a good read not only for military historians but also for researchers 
on global connectivity, interactions between the steppe and the sown and history of technology. 
The welcoming reception of this monograph by Mongolian Studies,2 Chinese – Türk cultural 
relations,3 late antique history4 and military history5 shows its popularity among various 
branches of scholarship.  
The structure of the monograph is logical and practical consisting of seven chapters: the first 
historiographical chapter on the relation of war and culture is followed by a presentation of the 
7th-century Chinese (Sui and early Tang) and Byzantine armies highlighting their resources, 
weaponry and tactics (2nd-4th chapters). The second half of the book offers interpretative 
answers for the above questions emphasizing the role of literary and textual traditions in the 
record and transfer of military knowledge. The investigative chapters (6-7) present these remote 
superpowers’ sporadic diplomatic contacts and interactions, as well as the intermediary role of 
nomadic confederacies and empires between them. Finally, the author explains comparable 
features and convergences of these two separate military systems with similar adaptive answers 
to nomadic threat.  
                                                          
1 (Graff 2002)  
2 (May 2015, 104–106.) 
3 (Skaff 2017, 226–228.)  
4 (Decker 2017, 802–803.)  
5 (Davies 2017, 542–544.) 
The historiographical essay on the relation of war and culture enquires the question of how the 
content of a 7th-century Chinese and European military manual can be so similar despite the 
vast geographical distance. Since the mid-20th century the belief in general principles of war 
resigned for a cultural-historical approach studying various ways of war and strategic cultures. 
The most prominent military historian of our days, John Keegan even called war as an 
„expression of culture”.6 The notion of „Western Way of War” as a particular and timeless 
European type of warfare deriving from the tactics of ancient Greeks hoplites and characterized 
by quick problem solving, decisive battle, and frontal attacks7 stems from this culture-centric 
approach.  Its counterpart, the „Oriental Way of War” was characterized by ‘evasion, delay and 
indirectness’ by Keegan.8 The information obtained from the two main sources presented by 
this book contradict this static framework. During the 7th century Chinese warfare was too 
western and aggressive, while Byzantine way of war proved to be too Asian and defensive 
questioning the exactness of these categories. In his book, Graff cut the Gordian knot and 
introduced the term „Eurasian Way of War”. 
The two empires: the Sui/Tang China and the Eastern Roman Empire possessed similar 
resources. Their territories and populations were comparable; their main difference was their 
geographic layout. China was basically a continental power with limited use of the navy, while 
the Eastern Roman Empire surrounded the Mediterranean Sea; it resulted in a powerful fleet 
exploiting its long and articulated coastline. The geostrategic considerations particularly 
highlight the lack of maps in this book. The two empires also differed in the number and 
organisation of soldiers: China used the system of part-time military service (fubing) beginning 
from the Warring States Period.  The Byzantine Empire formed a permanent and professional 
army smaller in number. At the same time, the expeditionary troops numbered between 12,000 
and 20,000 in both areas. 
The armies of these two states used weaponry on a similar technological level; the only 
significant exception was the frequent Chinese use of handheld crossbows. At the same time, 
at the end of the 6th century several types of military equipment appeared in the East Roman 
army as well as in early Avar burials. These artefacts were formerly unknown from western 
Eurasia, while frequently used in ancient China: lamellar armour,9 traction trebuchet and single-
edged ring-pommel swords10 wrongly described as sabres in the book. The two military 
manuals report on similar tactical elements, and risk calculations played a comparable role in 
military decisions.  
Campaigns relied on fundamental logistical planning like transfer, accommodation and food 
supply. The comparison between Chinese and Byzantine logistics failed in the absence of the 
recent and relevant literature on the logistical support of the East Roman Empire.11 The author 
ascribed the poor logistics of the Byzantine Empire to the damaged roads and lack of 
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distribution centres of supply compared to Tang China interlaced with canals. In fact, a dense 
network of fortresses and fortified cities with granaries served the logistical need of the East 
Roman army between the 4th and 7th centuries. Fortifications were not only designed for passive 
defence, but also for an active distribution of food supply.12 The Danube as the main artery of 
riverine transport compensated for the lack of canals in the frontier zone.13 The author rightly 
argues for a significant role of fortresses and sieges, however, some minor inaccuracies occur 
in the descriptions of major sieges.14  
The 7th-century Chinese and Byzantine military practice matched even the modern expectations 
in terms of organisation, discipline and risk management. This consciousness derived from the 
accumulation of several generations’ experiences by literary and textual traditions which 
characterised both bureaucratic empires. Both states had a great tradition of writing military 
manuals used and even brought to campaigns by generals. Both armies' administrations kept a 
large number of records, lists and reports. These documents survived only as paper fragments 
from the Western Regions of Tang China or as late antique papyruses from Egypt. These living 
traditions inherited from Antiquity led to the continuous development of armies and 
generalship.  
The vast distance between China and the Mediterranean seriously questions every historical 
comparison between these remote areas; however, the two empires were aware of each other 
and had diplomatic and commercial relations beginning from the Han-period. These accidental 
and sparse encounters and the blurred and uncertain information on each other limited the 
spread of military innovations.  
Both empires had close contacts with their northern nomadic neighbours (Türks and Avars) 
providing a connecting link by the Eurasian steppe zone between East and West.  The author 
regarded the migration of the Avars coming from Inner Asia15 as a transmission vector of East 
Asian technology reviewing sources and literature on the origin of the Avar elite and 
enumerating a series of East Asian military innovations adopted by the Byzantine based on the 
Strategikon.  
The description of Avar – Byzantine interactions contains several inaccuracies. The formation 
of sabre cannot be dated to the period of Avar migration (mid-6th century), it was a process circa 
100 years later.16 Moreover, the paramerion interpreted as a single-edged sword or sabre was a 
weapon of the Middle Byzantine Period (9th-10th centuries).17 The Chinese origin of P-shaped 
suspension loops is highly questionable since they appear contemporary with the European 
specimens at the end of the 6th century in China.18 Ring-pommel swords represent a new 
element in the list of weapons of Asian origin: such swords were frequent in the burials of the 
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early Avar elite from the Danube-Tisza Interfluve (Central Hungary) without local precedents. 
At the same time, this weapon type was continuously popular in China since the 4th century, 
and new Inner Asian finds confirm the possibility of an Avar transmission.19 
Lamellar armour and stirrups were in use in China long before their arrival to Europe around 
the formation of the Avar Qaghanate in the Danube Basin.20 Graff regarded the European 
appearance of the traction trebuchet as a result of an Avar transmission similarly to various 
researchers. The exact date of the stirrups’ and traction trebuchet’s adoption by the Byzantines 
is not so unambiguous. The first mention of stirrups in Maurice’s Strategikon does not 
enumerate it among the innovations of Avar origin; it does not even emphasize its novelty. 
Moreover, based on archaeological evidence from the Balkans, Byzantines widely used stirrups 
by the end of the 6th century, although their shape and manufacturing technique distinguished 
these artefacts from stirrups found in Avar burials.21 According to some philological analyses 
of the Strategikon, Byzantines used stirrups in the first half of the 6th century.22 
Traction trebuchet replaced early Roman torsion artillery, first of all the onager, offering a 
simple technique, larger projectiles and higher effective range. The early 6th-century sources 
mention this siege engine with the term helepolis used by the Byzantine army even before the 
arrival of the Avars to Europe.23 Theophylact’s anecdote on a Byzantine traitor, Bouzas at the 
siege of Appiaria who allegedly taught the Avars how to build siege engines, reveals further 
contradictions. Besides the literary topoi included in the story, not only the Avars used such 
siege engines earlier, but also the Eastern European Kutrigurs preceding them.24 Traction 
trebuchet was already known in the Arabian Peninsula in the early 7th century25  which questions 
the transmission through the steppe and suggests a Near Eastern technology transfer through 
the Sasanians.  
Graff regards the Avar transmission of the mentioned weapons and military equipment as 
proved. However, regarding the lack of literacy among the Avars, he refuses the probability of 
a nomadic mediation of tactical elements and ideas. At the same time, the direction, date and 
way of transmission of the mentioned weapons and military equipment are also uncertain.  
In the final chapter of the book, David A. Graff formulated a comprehensive thesis according 
to which not only military equipment of armies in Sui/Tang China and 6th-7th-century Byzantine 
Empire was similar, but also their tactics, the logistics of campaigns and even the long-term 
strategic targets. Graff ascribed these common points to the similar challenges these empires 
faced. Throughout their history, both empires confronted with troops of Eurasian steppe 
nomadic confederacies which determined their weaponry, tactics and strategic thought by their 
literary traditions and the nomadic federates (or mercenaries) serving in their armies.  
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Nomadic art of war fundamentally influenced Byzantine and Chinese warfare and transformed 
the armies of both empires. However, these two states experienced these impacts in different 
ways, and not only nomads affected their military affairs. The biggest difference between China 
and Byzantium was the three hundred years long fragmentation before Li Jing characterised by 
non-Han, nomadic rule in Northern China. The three hundred years-long age of fragmentation 
before Li Jing characterised by non-Han, nomadic rule in Northern China meant a huge 
difference. The barbarian rule manifested not only through the imperial family and the power 
of a small elite, but several nomads immigrated in the empire acculturating to the Chinese 
civilisation but preserving their language, customs and way of war.26 The position of this 
barbarian elite is comparable to the Germanic kingdoms on the ruins of the West Roman 
Empire. These rulers accepted their dependence from the (East or West) Roman emperor,27 
while northern barbarians in China founded imperial dynasties. By contrast, the East Roman 
Empire maintained its Roman imperial power, legal system and culture, as well as its Greek 
language and the Christian religion. In this empire, the army employed nomadic cavalry only 
as federates together with a significant Germanic influence on military affairs.  
Ignoring this fundamental political, social and cultural difference between the two empires, the 
author emphasizes religion and human resources as distinguishing factors. The Christian 
Byzantine Empire provided strong ideological support for its armed forces, while China’s 
enormous human resources – enabling massive invasions against Korea or the Türk Qaghanate 
– compensated for its religious fragmentation. Graff characterised Byzantine ‘grand strategy’ 
with diplomacy, bribery and alliance-building following Luttwak,28 which was only valid for 
some periods and regions.  The ever-changing combinations of imperial ambitions and regional 
strategies formed the Byzantine Empire’s responses to various threats29 instead of an 
overarching vision of grand strategy.  
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